Anarchy in Afghanistan
After almost twenty years of war, the United States has committed to withdrawing its active combat troops from Afghanistan by September 11th, 2021. It is fair to say that its involvement has not been a resounding success. Despite the hundreds of billions of dollars of military aid, nation-building and counter-insurgency efforts, the country remains relatively divided and deprived. The United States has recognised the necessity of engaging with the Taliban, an organisation it had deemed had harboured terrorists, to end its involvement in a war it could not win. Intra-Afghan talks have stalled, and now a full-blown conflict is again poised to wrack the country amidst massive territorial gains by the Taliban in recent weeks. In response, the Kabul-based Ghani government in a clear act of desperation has launched the ‘National Mobilisation initiative’ on 25th June, aimed at arming volunteers to stave off the unstoppable Taliban advance.
This is reminiscent of the US withdrawal from South Vietnam, where US forces were holding back Vietcong forces, but eventually had to leave, which caused the prompt collapse of the unpopular government and its ineffective military without its backing. The ramifications of a civil war, and de facto Taliban control of Afghanistan, and the very real eventuality of the Kabul government’s collapse will have dire consequences for the Afghan people, and cause cascading regional effects.
Back to Square One?
The resurgence of the Islamic emirate throughout the country will lead to a restoration of pre-2001 Sharia law, with the widespread dismantling of administrative and legal provisions of the current government. Women’s rights, in particular, have been highlighted as one of the main issues at risk from a Taliban takeover, not to mention the retribution against those who have, or are working with the Kabul government or coalition forces. However, even at the Taliban’s height, it did not control the entire country in the conventional sense, and they are unlikely to achieve total unification despite the ineptitude of Kabul’s security forces. Local militias and Tribal loyalties hold strong in the country, and regional groups such as the Northern Alliance will continue fighting even if Kabul falls, resulting in prolonged intermittent conflict. Nevertheless, the Taliban seem poised to become the de facto government in Afghanistan.
It is also unlikely that the Taliban will give open harbour to extremist groups again, at least to the pre-2001 extent, as they have exhibited more caution in their stances and overall strategy since their defeat. This concern is exhibited by their steady but careful advance through the countryside to avoid major urban centres, as to not trigger a response by departing US forces. Nevertheless, the resulting turmoil of an enduring civil war will complicate managing terrorism in the region, as a vacuum of power without a US presence will attract militant Islamic groups such as ISIL to use it as a base to launch global attacks despite the hostility of the Taliban towards it. However, friendly ties between the East Turkestan Islamic group and the Taliban threaten to bring China into the mix, and how the Taliban will deal with this conundrum as a credible state remains largely unknown.
The President of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan Ashraf Ghani meets the former foreign minister of India Sushma Swaraj in New Delhi, 24 October, 2017 - Office of the President of Afghanistan
Shockwaves in South Asia
In South Asia, India could lose a major regional ally in the Kabul government, as so far the two have built an alliance to counter the Taliban, and also to counter Pakistan’s covert support for the latter. Pakistan so far has expressed that the eruption of civil war could lead to a significant refugee crisis, and the resurgence in regional militias that the ‘National Mobilization’ could bring. The arming of regional militias significantly jeopardises regional security, as the porous borders, loose local governance of firearms, and Pakistan’s alleged policies of covertly supporting fundamentalist groups such as the Haqqani network, exacerbate potentially destabilising effects. The increase in arms proliferation could spiral into a deadly problem for Pakistan, as it would bear the brunt of militant spillover effects and refugees. India will also suffer, as arms proliferation could embolden and equip terrorists, and cause events reminiscent of the 2008 Mumbai attacks carried out by Lashkar-e-Taiba, a group that Pakistan also allegedly supports. The illicit drugs trade in South Asia will also experience a boom in that the Taliban and poor security in general, encourage opium and more recently, methamphetamine production for profit, exacerbating existing regional health crises.
The only clear way out of this is a peace deal involving a degree of power-sharing by the Taliban and the Kabul government to establish order and stability in the country, but this is rapidly slipping out of reach. Both view the other side antagonistically and there is little trust between them, with fundamentally differing ideologies. The Taliban, despite promises of political solutions, continue on their steady and highly successful offensive. There is little appetite for another international intervention. The conflict is now in Afghans’ hands, and the world must now brace for its effects.
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