Of Little Tyrants
In the years after the fall of the USSR, it was anticipated in the majority of foreign policy circles that liberal democracy would eventually find its way to the corners of the world. Backed by the uncontested financial and military might of the United States, authoritarian regimes would be isolated and collapse under the weight of their own oppressed people. This was partially true. Popular uprisings such as in Venezuela and Belarus have captured new cycles for days, with pledges from Western leaders to help, only for those movements to fizzle out instead of those regimes.
Unmovable pebbles
While richer states such as Gulf monarchies or China can sustain themselves on trading representation with wealth generation, the overwhelming wave of recent authoritarian turns from democracy has been tied to less wealthy states. States on the brink of ‘transition’ such as Venezuela and Myanmar with the rise of the Guaido-led opposition in the Assembly or the ascendance of Aung San Suu Kyi’s civilian government respectively have fallen back into strongman rule. While most states’ militaries often turn against their government in the case of mass civilian unrest, those who decide to remain ‘loyal’ are the most difficult to deal with. These cases differ from well-known examples in Russia and China, where the international community has no choice but to deal with them by dint of their power. Authoritarian regimes in smaller countries, especially those who have earned the ire of the United States, have no choice but to suffer the full weight of international sanctions, having their assets frozen and turned into pariahs.
The Popular Myth
The notion of a popular revolution overthrowing a dictator is highly romanticised, and sometimes does work. The 2014 Maidan revolution in Ukraine, the 2010 Jasmine Revolution in Tunisia are examples that general strikes, civil disobedience, and demonstrations that can bring a fall to even an authoritarian regime. However, it is far more likely that the dictator would be overthrown in a coup than a popular uprising from a historical perspective. The armed forces are one of the most important factions in an authoritarian government, as they have the physical force to change the regime without much resistance. It is also unique as they are one of the few factions that are difficult, if not impossible to coerce due to their power, and thus must be co-opted into support.
The theory of the power-sharing dilemma presents itself here, as more power and resources must be diverted to the military to appease them, but in this very act, the dictatorship inherently weakens themselves relative to the latter. Nevertheless, the dictatorship can maintain a sustainable relationship with its military by integrating itself efficiently into the military itself. This strategy can coalesce in a number of ways, such as Venezuela making promotion conditional to the patronage of the regime, and turning a blind eye to illicit profiteering. Instead of weakening it, this integration and clientelism strengthened the bond between it and the military, encouraging loyalty in the officer corps and affirmation of the former’s dominance.
The Temptation of Action
Arming ‘moderate rebels’ as proxies to overthrow them is not a good idea either. The arms supplied by the US to elements of rebel Pashtun and Islamist groups to fight the Soviets were turned back on them, and arms provided to Syrian rebels to fight Assad later weakened both forces’ ability to resist ISIS’s infamous rise, the escalation leading to myriad more problems including regional spillovers and humanitarian disasters. Even more radical are direct foreign interventions, which infamously cause power vacuums and the emboldening of the regime’s equally unsavory enemies.
Effectively, regimes such as these cannot be removed safely by most measures. The best, and arguably the most counterintuitively responsible way is to simply endure, and let these regimes expire in time. Strategic patience does not grant the immediate pleasure of intervention, the conscientious urge many feel is the duty to overthrow oppressors. However, punitive sanctions inflict the most pain on the ordinary, isolation pushes them into the arms of other authoritarian powers, and in many cases, the liberator becomes the invader.
In Venezuela and Afghanistan, the exclusion from international financial systems and Western-controlled monetary institutions has crippled their economies, causing cascading shortages of basic and essential amenities to their civilian population. Infamously, the latter and Iraq have proved to be moral and military quagmires long after their authoritarian regimes were overthrown.