The Return to Irredentism?
The Spectre of Territorial Conquest Re-emerges from the Ashes
Since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February, it was clear that Putin would seek to formally and “legally” root his ambitions of territorial conquest and reunification in democratic tradition. In a similar fashion to the referendum that formalised Crimea’s annexation, those conducted in the Donbas regions were characterised by coercion, an absence of anonymity, and corruption. The Luhansk People’s Republic (LPR), Donetsk People’s Republic (DPR), and the formerly Russian-occupied regions of Kherson and Zaporizhzhia all “voted” overwhelmingly for reunification with Russia, thus beginning the formal annexation process.
The longing for the reunion of former territories and populations that have since been incorporated into other states - or indeed achieved independence - has seen a resurgence across the world not experienced on a scale since Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan’s conquests in the Second World War. It seems that irredentism has captured the hearts and minds of policymakers and leading politicians from Beijing to Moscow, Delhi to Islamabad. The visible return of this brand of geopolitical policy threatens a prolonged period of liberal, legally backed international norms that have - albeit with some notable exceptions - precipitated an era of relative global peace.
Russia Ukraine occupation zones and front-lines as of the 14th of November, 2022 - Institute for the Study of War, 2022
Ukraine, the Arctic, and the Former Soviet Union
Russia’s wars and interference with its former Soviet satellites, and members of the USSR are not a new phenomenon. The conflict with Ukraine follows closely a playbook that has been deployed against Georgia, Chechnya, and Crimea. The Russian state first disseminates domestic and international propaganda and stokes tensions between ethnic groups in the target state, claiming support for marginalised or threatened ethnic Russian or Russophone populations. When unrest boils over into violence, the rationale for military intervention emerges and “limited intervention” begins. Whilst in some cases such as Transnistria and Georgia, the intervention exists for peripheral geopolitical objectives that are perhaps tangential to irredentism and more jingoistic, the situation in Ukraine has culminated in outright annexation.
Whilst the foundations of this territorial expansion are grounded in the supposed historical context of national origin, others are perhaps less about irredentism and more closely associated with outright expansion.
The thawing of glaciers, permafrost, and sea ice around the Arctic Circle are opening up new avenues of economic exploitation that have otherwise been locked behind an icy wall. Whilst the thawing permafrost in Siberia represents the opportunity to extract more oil and gas, and perhaps greater agricultural output- offshore expansion has seen much greater contention internationally. The potential for natural resource extraction and the opening of new Arctic shipping lanes has prompted the eight Arctic States - states with a coastal border in the Arctic Circle - to gather evidence to legitimise and assert their claim on the international stage.
Present territorial claims by Arctic Circle Countries - The Economist, 2022
China, Taiwan, and the South China Sea
China and its territorial ambitions are perhaps more nuanced than those of Russia. Chinese territorial expansion during the 20th Century picked up speed after the Sino-Soviet split, with the consolidation of its far-Eastern territories in Xinjiang province (specifically the annexation of the Second-East Turkestan Republic) and South Tibet. China’s conflicts with Vietnam throughout the ‘70s and ’80s led to the collection of territories in the South China Sea - including the Paracel Islands - thus setting the stage for increased expansion in the 21st Century and somewhat “grounding” its 9-Dash Line claims.
Principal of all its claims, however, is the island nation of Taiwan, representing the thorn in the side of Beijing that has on its own achieved great levels of prosperity and provided a blueprint for a democratic China that serves to undermine - though to little effect - the legitimacy of the ruling CCP. When Mao Zedong attempted to take Taiwan by force during the Second Taiwan-Strait Crisis in 1958 the combination of Taiwanese military force and limited-US intervention repelled the attacks. Ever since, Taiwan has slowly but steadily asserted its economic and political independence, becoming a flourishing democracy and the centerpiece of the global supply chain for semiconductors - TSMC since becoming the jewel in the crown of the Taiwanese economy. Needless to say, in the context of US-Chinese rivalry, bringing the Taiwanese economy under fully-fledged Chinese ownership, notwithstanding the domestic political benefits such a union would confer, would be present itself as a crowning achievement of President Xi’s tenure as leader of China.
A Fourth Taiwan-Strait Conflict seems now to only be a matter of when rather than if.