The Russian Juggernaut Gathers Pace
Moscow Snaps Back from Complacency
Much ink has been spilled over the viability of Ukraine’s defense over the last few weeks. Doubts had been mounting since Ukraine’s failed Zaporizhzhia counteroffensive, the dismissal of respected commander Valery Zaluzhnyy, wrangling over aid in Western capitals and capped by the fall of Avdiivka last Saturday. However, not much can be gleaned from whether Ukraine can make good on its current malaise. That is only half the equation, however; Russia retains the initiative on the battlefield and the global stage, whose will, power, and resilience will be equally crucial to how the war shapes up in the coming years. It had been complacent and confident since it snatched Crimea in 2014, but after its humiliation at the gates of Kyiv, its elites were stung into action and the results do not bode well for Ukraine.
The War Economy Gears Up
Pundits had been predicting “peak missiles” for the past two years as Russia pounded Ukrainian cities around the clock with long-range missiles in an apparent attempt to demoralize its defenders. Both seem to have been wrong so far. Russian bombardment has not reduced Ukrainian morale, but its stocks have not run dry. This is reflective of a more pervasive narrative that has taken root in pro-Ukrainian circles but is ultimately harmful to its cause: that time is on Ukraine’s side and Russia will soon exhaust its reserves.
Whether in drones, shells, or missiles, Moscow outstrips its opponent in sheer numbers if not in quality. The Ukrainian army is rationing itself to 2,000 shells a day, while Russian forces fire off three to five times that amount. Russian officials have lauded the progress of its efforts to boost arms production, and Western officials have privately admitted they underestimated its ability to produce ammunition. Though perhaps the maths still don’t add up for Russia’s voracious appetite for shells, it is certainly going to exceed Western deliveries this year; the EU promised to deliver 1mn shells to Ukraine last March. One year later, Zelensky said that only 30% of those arrived.
However, the real advantage of Moscow’s military-industrial complex is certainty. Western arms manufacturers worry about fickle policymakers in Washington and Brussels who might backtrack on military aid and are wary of spending billions on expanding their capacity. This might be more likely as right-wing influence surges across Europe, or if Donald Trump returns to the White House after the US election in November. By contrast, Russian officials have declared “everything for the front” and mean it. Moscow has ramped up defense spending to a third of total expenditure, while the majority of arms companies being state-owned doesn’t hurt either. The state can therefore make long-term plans that are more informed and flexible than Ukraine’s flimsy arrangements.
Russia’s alliances hold fast
Russia’s position is also reasonably strong abroad.
On the military side of things, it seems that its cordiality with militant and relatively isolated states such as Iran and North Korea has borne fruit—they have vast arsenals of cheap ammunition. Pyongyang already has sent over a million shells in exchange for valuable technical know-how for its ambitious space program, while Tehran has been a reliable supplier of missiles and drones. Certainty comes into play once again. Both parties have already committed themselves as anti-US actors for the medium term as Iran’s backing of Hamas and Hezbollah and North Korea’s constitutional changes put them squarely at odds with US allies Israel and South Korea. Both have significant military-industrial complexes and weapons are one of the few goods they have in great excess but are otherwise a drain on their economy. Now they have gained a significant new long-term export market in Russia.
A key strength of the relationship is also its transactional nature. Unlike aid to Ukraine, both sides are keen to procure the other’s goods. Pyongyang and Tehran want Russian soft power and technology transfer, if not that, then for rials and rubles. Meanwhile, despite the pleas of pundits, Ukrainian politicians and their allies that dollars and euros sent to Ukraine are a very cost-effective way to invest in the West’s security (I am inclined to agree with that assessment), there is increasing rhetoric, especially in right-wing circles, that continued aid is untenable, based on either Ukraine’s inevitable defeat, or that they will never get the money back.
Meanwhile, many countries refuse to join comprehensive sanctions designed to choke Russia off from international trade. The big whales here are China and India, who have gobbled up Russian oil and gas since its closure to Western markets, propping up the Kremlin’s coffers. China has also been a key source of investment, technical know-how and all kinds of goods from advanced capital equipment to automobiles, while many firms who export them are shielded by transshipment via the “stans.” It has also provided a safe haven in the renminbi, which offers a viable and (relatively) stable currency in which to trade and invest after Russian banks were cut off from dollar-denominated trade. All of this has significantly weakened the effect of Western sanctions on the Russian economy, and are unlikely to tilt in the West’s and Ukraine’s favor anytime soon.
The West’s battle for the “hearts and minds” of the Global South has lost almost all credibility after its initial refusal to censure Israel for its campaign in Gaza. Although they are growing more vocal and the scale of casualties mount, the damage has been done. Russia also has reasonably invested in relationships with African and Asian countries, which the West has scorned or underdelivered to. Middle powers from Saudi Arabia to Vietnam, Brazil to India still count Moscow among their strategic partners, if not their friends.
Putin has chosen his allies well, but Ukraine’s foreign aid is hostage with the unpredictable mire of Western politics for now.
A War Of Attrition
Last year, the former head of Ukraine’s military Valery Zaluzhny wrote an article for the Economist, claiming the war was at a stalemate and that if new paradigm-changing technologies were not deployed, attritional warfare would characterize the conflict ahead (and exacerbating tensions between him and Zelensky over war messaging, ultimately ending with the former’s dismissal). Such a war would put Ukraine at a significant disadvantage; it has far less resources at hand than Russia. Not just that, the Russian ability to mobilize its war economy under its command and oversight, along with its less affluent, but heavily armed allies outperform that of Ukraine’s Western lifelines.
Russia seems well-equipped to handle the conflict ahead. Ukraine’s future is much less certain.