The Facets of Strategic Autonomy

The rhetoric of a new cold war has has gained traction as tensions between Western countries and Russia and China rise. The image of the alliance system is enduring, as trade and security for smaller countries broadly rely on greater powers to be adequate. Drives for economic decoupling, accelerated by the reliance on Chinese supply chains and the unresolved US-China trade dispute, as well as the resurgence of human rights issues in great-power relations imply that suspicions and hostilities will endure in the long term. As a result, analysis of global political affairs seem to revolve around the paradigm of bandwagoning or balancing against threats.

Despite this, some states have chosen to pursue a foreign policy doctrine of strategic autonomy. Turkey is one such power that is employing this doctrine and executed this relatively well considering its resources and adversaries. Being a regional power, it lacks the broad economic clout to excel and compete in all fields of the global industry relative to great powers, but it has positioned itself as a major player in the Middle East by filling in niches that others have failed to identify.

Prudent Politics

Politically, it has entrenched itself in its region by forging strategic partnerships with the Tripoli-based Government of National Accord (GNA) in Libya, Qatar, which had until recently been effectively excommunicated by its traditional Gulf allies, Russia, the pariah of the West, and factions in Northern Syria directly supported by the Turkish military which gives it a stake in the Syrian Civil War. These alliances may seem unwise, as they are heavily burdened by their own struggles, but it is a calculated investment in its road to strategic autonomy. The early support Ankara gives to these unstable governments, when and if they succeed in their internal struggles, will allow the former to have leverage or establish friendly relations, and secure vital resources and allies when they are needed.

The President of the Republic of Turkey Recep Tayyip Erdoğan meets the former head of the Libyan GNA Fayez al-Sarraj in Istanbul, 27 November 2019 (Handout)

For example, the Turkish desire to extend its influence in global energy as well as energy independence has been a core drive in its involvement in Libya and to an extent, Qatar as well, which have enormous reserves of oil and natural gas respectively. This has led to concrete commitments which have ultimately paid off. Turkey and Qatar have inked deals to purchase cheaper hydrocarbons from the latter. In addition, the end of the Second Libyan Civil War has bolstered the credibility of previous Turkish-GNA agreements signed to extend maritime boundaries for maritime energy exploration against Turkey’s traditional adversary Greece.

Disruptive Technologies

In its pursuit of an autonomous security policy, Turkey has paved the way for its intervention with the development of its aerospace industry, specifically with its UAVs. The notorious Bayraktar TB2 drone has proven decisive in aiding Turkey’s ally Azerbaijan to victory in the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, and in the Second Libyan Civil War. This inexpensive instrument has delivered disproportional results, a prime example of the economic advantages of disruptive technologies and its combat effectiveness against orthodox strategies, highlighted in a previous article. This has won Turkey many interested buyers attempting to procure this highly effective weapon, including Saudi Arabia, Ukraine and Poland, the latter two of which have confirmed they have received deliveries. This prudent investment could turn into a lucrative export trade for Turkey, earn it influence in the global arms trade and political leverage using this highly sought-after weapon.

A Bayraktar TB2 UAV in a military parade in Baku marking the Azerbaijani victory in the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, 10 December, 2020 - Official Archives of the President of the Republic of Azerbaijan

Counting the Cost

However, its previous great-power ally, the United States is evidently displeased with this deviation from its own security networks and interests, as Turkey is a NATO member and until recently was not belligerently involved in the Middle East. This was brought to the forefront by the sanctioning of Turkey under CAATSA due to its purchase of Russian S-400 anti-aircraft missiles instead of the US’s Patriot systems in 2020, as well as the removal of Turkey from F-35 production chains and procurement. The US Congress was also close to implementing more sanctions on Turkey for its military presence in Libya under the Libya Stabilization Act. These have seriously soured Turkish-US relations as well as moderately damaged the Turkish economy and hurt its currency, the lira. Arguably, the procurement of the F-35 is of little consequence to Ankara, as it is using its advanced UAVs as strike vehicles already, and will use the S-400 for deterrence, mitigating its deprivation of the Joint Strike Fighter. With this, it has advanced relations with Russia, which has many overlapping security interests in the Caucasus and the Middle East; and will be needed to advance Ankara’s drive for energy diversification.

This has also upset the regional order and caused concern in powers such as Israel, Saudi Arabia, and Iran due to its new willingness to physically and politically engage them and their traditional areas of influence. Turkey has now taken a more active interest in Palestinian affairs, angering Israel; forged a relationship with Qatar, which Saudi Arabia views within its sphere; and intervened in Syria against Bashar al-Assad which has upset Iran, which is allied to the latter. Moreover, its traditional rival Greece, and increasingly Egypt are increasingly unnerved and have improved relations between them to counter growing Turkish involvement. Despite this, the entry of Turkey is also being seen as a boon as it could be a very helpful ally. Iran and Turkey have seen the need for closer ties due to each other’s power and the significant energy trade between them, despite differences in Syrian and Iraq, and Saudi-Turkish ties are warming in light of Riyadh’s desire to purchase Turkish drones and Palestinian issues.

Strategic autonomy is a serious gamble, but in the long-term, affords a fuller pursuit of specific ambitions foreign policy objectives, impossible to bandwagoning states as they are systematically reliant and subservient to the Great Power sponsor’s interests. It requires the state to carefully cultivate and invest in alliances, as well as identify and develop cost-effective ways of projecting hard power in the absence of a large economy relative to other great powers. The costs of deviation in an increasingly polarised world may prove to be less than expected, as great powers instead are trying to secure allies, not punish them as exemplified by the light effect of the US sanctions on Turkey, and the benefits seem very tempting indeed.