The First Rule of War is Economics
The increasing belligerence with which the United States and China have approached each other has lent mounting concern towards the preparedness of the former to defend its allies in the Indo-Pacific. The two now increasingly see each other as an intrinsic threat to their place in the world order, and domestic rhetorics now veer sharply towards military deterrence, rather than de-escalation as the norm for managing the other. A little under two decades ago, China balked at the idea of a military confrontation with the United States, backing down from its escalations in the Third Taiwan Strait crisis. Two things have remained constant, and are often focused on in the discourse of a potential conflict. The United States has retained a significant lead in military expenditure, and has the edge in traditional military technologies.
USS Theodore Roosevelt Carrier Strike Group conducting a Freedom of Navigation Operation in the South China Sea, April 9, 2021 - US Department of Defense
Asymmetric Warfare
Less discussed is the rapid shift in disruptive technologies that shift the strategic dynamic. In the Second World War, the carrier-based doctrines demonstrated its superiority over battleship-based ones, and the concentration of tanks superseded traditional understandings of its use as dispersed infantry support. Among other things, these were significant factors that led to the early successes of the Axis powers, and those methods were subsequently used by the Allies to turn the tide with superior resources. There has not been a direct major engagement of the world’s great powers since. These technologies have implications beyond their immediate combat effectiveness, which are revealed in the lens of their cost-effectiveness.
The rapid modernisation and development of China’s cyber-warfare and missile technology, relating to anti-access/area-denial systems (A2-AD) have become concerns for US military thinkers, but have yet to catch the attention of the mainstream discourse. To be clear, these developments are not entirely new to military thinkers. Western observers cite Soviet and Russian strategy in cost-effective A2-AD bubbles in the face of NATO naval and air dominance, developing sophisticated air defence systems and cheap missiles that could threaten relatively expensive ships should they enter their range.
The pillars of modern US military force projection, costly aircraft carriers and advanced aircraft can be countered at a fraction of the costs of deployment and maintenance. In these considerations, US defence spending may seem profligate. Chinese DF-21D, DF-26 and new hypersonic missiles could disable or destroy capital ships within the first, even second island chain. Alleged Chinese (and Russian) cyber-warfare capabilities have proven extremely potent in crippling their targets. Extremely high levels of US spending on ‘system of systems’ immersion, such as the unprecedented integration of information systems in coordination, navigation and combat may come back to bite when faced with electronic warfare which could pose a serious threat that might cause cascading systemic failure. The Chinese economy is already larger than the US’s by PPP, which is relevant as China now domestically produces much of its own equipment. The US will not only be at a disadvantage on the battlefield, but on the production and strategic level despite its superior spending. China is also quickly catching up, and building its own carriers. The only difference will be that its fleets and airforce will be under the aegis of its sophisticated A2-AD network. Under present conditions, the US is already unable to sustain a protracted conflict in the Indo-Pacific, as demonstrated by multiple wargames performed by the Pentagon and the RAND corporation in such a scenario.
DF-26 missiles in the National Day parade in Beijing, October 1, 2019 - Xinhua
Doctrine Complacency
Critics claim that capital ships and fifth-generation fighters are extremely difficult to track, let alone destroy, as they have escorts and stealth technology to complement their resilience. This is true in a tactical aspect, but the strategic initiative is retained by the defensive side, as only one of the many inexpensive missiles or hackers is needed to breach their defences for the attack to compromise their combat viability.
The US cannot hope to adequately challenge China in the Indo-Pacific in a conventional conflict and protect its allies while tunnel-visioned by orthodoxy. Not only does the US already possess significant traditional assets, but there are legislative and bureaucratic inertias in re-allocating resources. The military-industrial complex has already committed to producing these expensive systems as they return higher profits.
Therefore, it must actively address the shifting dynamics and re-arm its military for such engagements such that it is on the vanguard of strategic and tactical developments. Such a shift faces significant challenges. To mitigate its existing assets against these developments, it must identify its exact weaknesses specifically against the threat. Early-warning systems, AAW platforms, and cyber-security could be places to start in this aspect. It must also adapt its strategies and equipment accordingly. Hugely expensive capital ships could be gradually phased out in favour of greater numbers of smaller multi-mission ships such as the upcoming Constellation-class guided-missile frigates, and UAVs which could be deployed instead of fighter aircraft to shift the cost and risk-dynamic back on the defender.
The rapid pace of technological development, paired with the lack of a direct great-power conflict since 1945 has caused an atmosphere of uncertainty, which inclines policy-makers to hedge towards established doctrines. US complacency in its superior spending and traditional technologies blinds it to the developing strategic dynamic, and by the time it realises, it might be too late.
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