Ensuring Security and Continued Stability

The United States has been involved in East Asian affairs since its first expedition to Japan under Matthew Perry in 1854 and has since engaged with East Asia diplomatically, economically, culturally, and militarily through a myriad of avenues, contributing to both times of stability and instability. US military involvement in the 20th century was significant, with its participation in the Pacific Theatre of World War II, the US helped to end Japanese expansionism and later continued its East Asian military entanglements in proxy wars with the Soviet Union in Korea and Vietnam.

In a modern context, however, the impact of the US’s East Asian presence can be boiled down to its involvement in three regional issues.

Donald Trump and Kim Jong-un in Singapore, 2018 - Sky News

North Korea: Nuclear Tensions

The issue of North Korean nuclearization has created a significant degree of instability regionally for East Asia, specifically for Northeast Asia. Whilst the conflict has not been “hot” since the armistice agreement signed in 1953, North Korea (DPRK) remains an active threat through belligerent behaviour and nuclear testing. The United States’ involvement in the Korean War and its Mutual Defence Treaties with both Japan and South Korea have entangled its own security with its regional interests and as such, there has been a permanent US presence in both South Korea since the 1950’s to deal with any potential threat from the DPRK.

For the DPRK, the continued US presence has been deeply destabilising. Firstly, the US maintains some 28,500 active military personnel stationed in South Korea. Whilst the smallest the force has ever been – since the US Forces Korea (USKF) was established in 1950 – the annual military training exercises conducted in conjunction with the South Korean military display the credible threat to North Korean sovereignty the US presence poses. Indeed, the deployment of modern US anti-ballistic missile systems – most notoriously, THAAD – in South Korea, compromises (to some extent) the DPRK’s credible nuclear deterrent, and thus own security, which in turn leads the DPRK to pursue more advanced nuclear deployment systems such as the recently tested KN-23.

Despite historically hostile relations, the US has recently brought some level of stability with a quasi-rapprochement strategy executed under the Trump administration. Successfully getting the Kim regime to the negotiating table in Singapore was the first time a US president had met a North Korean leader, and subsequently, the US went on to support the Panmunjom Declaration through the signing of a joint statement to normalise relations with the DPRK. Part of the strategy, and as a reassurance to North Korea of the US commitment to friendlier relations, the US in early 2018 temporarily halted its “Foal Eagle” military exercises with the South Korean army before resuming them later in 2018, albeit at a reduced scale. Despite the historical significance of these talks, however, the DPRK has continued its ICBM and ballistic missile programme conducting numerous tests since the Singapore summit highlighting the limitations of the US’s efforts.

The US presence in South Korea as well as its bases in Okinawa, Japan, however, provide its two key regional allies with an enhanced sense of stability they might otherwise not enjoy. Both South Korea and Japan are within strike range of numerous types of North Korean nuclear weapons and other ballistic missiles. As signatories to American Mutual Defence Treaties, both countries, therefore, fall under the protection of the US nuclear umbrella, an important deterrent given that neither country operates a (known) nuclear weapons programme. The US Mutual Defence Treaties with Japan and South Korea – and more broadly, its “Hub and Spokes” strategy – also continue to lend stability to Northeast Asia by stabilising a coalition of sorts that might not exist without American involvement. Since Japan and South Korea have historically – and continue to – maintain strained relations given their shared history and Japan’s military conquests in the 20th century.

Tsai Ing-Wen speaking at Columbia University, 2019 - Columbia News

Taiwan: Guarantor of Sovereignty?

On the issue of Taiwan, the US presence in the region has been somewhat less definitive in its stabilising role. The US posture of Strategic Ambiguity has kept China guessing as to whether the US would engage China in a very costly and protracted conflict over the island’s sovereignty. Since the deployment of the 7th Fleet in response to the Second Taiwan Strait Crisis, the US has continued to maintain a significant naval presence in the East China Sea and occasionally in the Taiwan Strait to deter acts of Chinese aggression toward Taiwan. Such forays by the US navy have been met with some response and perhaps has destabilised the strait to some extent, by raising the chances of a confrontation, accidental or otherwise. Despite the status quo territorially having remained, that of Taiwan’s de-facto independence, the US presence has prompted significant naval armament efforts on part of the Chinese. Partly as a countermeasure to the mentioned armament effort, as well as a legislated responsibility, the continued arms sales to Taiwan from the US have ensured Taiwan’s defensive effort remain modernised and credible, increasing Taiwan’s security, but also solidifying a reality where Taiwan continues to slip away from Beijing’s grasp. It can therefore be said that the US has stabilised Taiwan’s position in East Asia, but on the flipside created an atmosphere of insecurity and instability for China.

Tsai Ing Wen’s Democratic Progressive Party stands in the way of such a reunification effort from the mainland, insisting that the “Taiwan Consensus” – a rejection of the 1992 Consensus regarding reunification – remains in paramount opposition. Such rising tensions have called on the US to abandon its posture of Strategic Ambiguity for a posture of Strategic Clarity to better safeguard Taiwanese independence. This viewpoint, however, disregards the clear deterioration in relations between China and the US over the past decade, heating of tensions that could boil over into a significant conflict if mismanaged.

It is important to note that China has repeatedly publicly announced that it reserves the right to resort to military force if Taiwan does not come peacefully into the fold in the coming years. Xi recently very explicitly stated in a speech in January 2019 that “We do not promise to renounce the use of force and reserve the option to use all necessary measures”.

Xi Jinping and then-Vice President Joe Biden in Beijing, 2013 - Japan Times, 2021

China: Great Power Rivalry

For China, the US represents an existential threat to the ongoings of what it perceives to be its own “back-yard”. To China, the US interference in the Korean War and the creation of the South Korean state, alongside the formation of post-war Japan, and the proliferation of democracy in South East Asia represents an intrusion into the Sinosphere that parallels the imperialism of European nations before. The US “Hub and Spokes” Alliance system, perhaps weakened by increasing Chinese influence, remains a threat to Chinese regional dominance.

Chinese attempts to restore international perceptions – and the respect – of Chinese power projection, influence, and territory can perhaps be expressed by its movements in the South China Sea. The assertion of its historical sovereignty over the South China Sea is enshrined in the former Eleven Dash Line drawn up by the ROC in 1947, which has since been modified to include a new tenth dash added in 2013 – now encompassing the sea East of Taiwan in its claim. Whilst the Permanent Court of Arbitration ruled against the legitimacy of this claim under the auspices of the UNCLOS (United Nations Convention on the Law of the Seas), China refuted it. In order to “check” China’s growing naval presence in the South China Sea, the US Navy has conducted FONOPs (Freedom of Navigation Operations) through contested maritime territory within China’s claimed borders. Seen by China as provocative behaviour, the PLA has “scrambled fighter-bombers” to intercept and “intimidate” US naval vessels on multiple occasions. In one instance, a Chinese Luyang II-class destroyer came within 42 yards of the USS Decatur forcing it to alter course. Regardless of the perception of legality, US FONOPs destabilise the region by provoking Chinese military responses and escalating the chances of a miscalculated encounter that could turn into an international incident or worse.

The US presence in South Korea does not only increase the insecurity of the DPRK but also that of China. Not necessarily the presence of US military personnel but more so the presence of US defence systems – such as THAAD – impact the credibility of Chinese power projection into the Korean peninsula and undermine its ability to come to the defence of the DPRK, and to honour its mutual defence agreement were it triggered by an invasion from the South. The existence of the DPRK as a buffer state between China and the US-aligned East Asian bloc, serves to keep the US military at a figurative “arm’s length”, from its northern Manchurian border. However, were North Korea to be reunited with South Korea – either by force or otherwise – there could exist a reality where US troops become stationed on the Chinese border. In this sense China very much seeks to maintain the status quo territorially. Whilst the US is not necessarily actively pursuing this outcome, its stationed forces may be decreasing the security of China, and by extension, its willingness to cooperate on the issue of North Korea.

The US has however not held back from openly provoking hostile relations with China and North Korea. Especially, the diplomatic stance, policy, and language during the Trump administration saw relations decline significantly. In part a result of the Trump administration’s “America First” policy, the US sought to engage in “strategic decoupling” with China in terms of trade, which saw a protracted trade war between the two states destabilise global financial and commodity markets and broader trade creating immense uncertainty.

Overall, the United States’ presence in East Asia continues to ensure broad regional stability in regard to the maintenance of the status quo. It is however evident that the credibility of the deterrence strategy of the US Navy has waned in recent years given the pace of development of hypersonic missiles and the realisation of China’s Anti-Access/Area-Denial strategy.

Whether such stability continues remains to be seen.