Why a Sino-Russian Alliance is Closer Than Ever Before

The world watches for what Russia has in store for Ukraine. As hundreds of thousands of troops continue to mass on the border, Russia’s Putin and China’s Xi met at the sidelines of the Beijing Olympics. This is not news. Russia and China have shared cordial relations since Putin ascended to the Presidency and signed a memorandum of friendship in 2001. 

However, this time they issued an extremely rare statement, backing Russia in the current standoff with Ukraine and condemning NATO’s activities in Europe. China has traditionally refrained from commenting on security issues beyond the Indo-Pacific and maintains warmer relations with Europe than it does with the US. In turn, Russia has in a rare move, explicitly condemned notions of Taiwanese independence, and asserted Beijing’s stance that it is a part of the PRC. Along with this, were pledges to cooperate in the fields of artificial intelligence and information technology. Analysts have long warned of the possibility of an ‘alliance against the West’, but so far that worry was dormant, as the Sino-Russian relationship had its own disputes and the lack of opposition from the West to China’s rise.  

Now, an increasingly sceptical West is growing hostile to Russia and China. Attitudes in the West have turned sour as Putin backed Belarus’s Lukashenko in crushing violent protests, and renewed concerns over Ukraine’s security. In East Asia, China’s increasing military buildup and maritime claims worry the United States and neighbouring Western-aligned states such as Japan. The United States has ramped up accusations of human rights abuses against both Russia and China and urged the world to condemn them. 

A Warm Friendship

It is in this context that Russia and China have deepened relations in economic and security aspects. Chinese patronage of Russian gas and the occasional joint military exercise have traditionally marked the extent of their relationship. The geopolitical lens through which this is viewed is increasingly apparent as tensions rise in the Indo-Pacific and Eastern Europe. China, increasingly anxious about their maritime oil routes, due to the threat of the US Navy, pursued secure land-based options by pushing for further Russian and Kazakh sources and pipelines with a deal worth $117.5 billion inked at the meeting in addition to existing ‘Power of Siberia’ pipelines. It also wants to prop up its beleaguered ally’s economy, as its exports had been crippled by US sanctions. Russia, on its part, sees China as a valuable consumer of its oil and gas, whose reserves are one of the world’s largest and the principal source of state income. Despite record sales from gas to Europe this year due to pandemic and weather-related events, Russia is interested in diversifying its customers beyond Europe, as the latter’s long-term reliability is eroding due to increasing skepticism of Russia’s use of its energy as a geopolitical tool.

Both Russia and China have long seen benefits in increasing trade and cooperation, as they see a way to lower risk for each other. The West in their eyes is increasingly stingy, mercurial, and does not respect their sovereignty and security grievances. It is also reaching into their backyard. To see former Soviet states, which they call the ‘near abroad’, slipping to Western influence disturbs Moscow, and to further accept retreat by losing Ukraine to NATO is a red line that cannot be crossed. The United States meanwhile, is raising Taiwan’s diplomatic profile and continues to rankle China with weapons sales and ‘Freedom of Navigation Operations’ of the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea.

Although both have been historically closely aligned, they have never taken explicit stances on each other’s security stances, vis-a-vis the situation with Ukraine and Taiwan. The similarities between these two situations are uncanny. Both want to align more closely to the West, yet their larger neighbours have made this difficult, through a combination of carrots and sticks. They also both face what Western analysts reckon is a threat of invasion. 

A Hot Alliance

Western actions against Russia and China will also be less effective if the latter cooperate closely on mitigating possible effects, such as sanctions and diplomatic offensives. A possibility might be if the US, UK and France try to assemble comprehensive restrictions on Russian business operations in Europe, China might step in and use its economic leverage to persuade more cautious countries to adopt a moderate stance, and disrupt a united Western response. Conversely, Russia could use its cordial relations with India to disrupt the unity of the Quad, which is seen as an alliance of countries mainly aligned against Chinese influence.

Additionally, the concern exists that China is watching what the response would be if Russia proceeds with an intervention. If Russia pursues aggressive action, such as a conventional invasion, and is met with a weak Western response, it could factor favourably in its consideration to take Taiwan with military force. Closer security and intelligence cooperation between the two could also compound the challenge to US forces and its allies in the Pacific. 10 Chinese and Russian warships passed through the Japanese Tsugaru Strait in October 2021 raised alarm bells in Tokyo, and were interpreted as a veiled threat by the former. 

Yet, the West’s worst nightmare of a Sino-Russian military alliance has not materialised, and will not in the immediate future. China especially, does not seek a square-off with the West intrinsically, especially with Europe, where valuable markets lie. It has carefully stayed out of European politics despite the statement and has made attempts to maintain decent relations with the European Union. While Russia has been relatively proactive in drawing Western ire, its partner is the weaker link in the chain. Nevertheless, the meeting marked an inflection point where both powers first made inroads towards each others’ distant interests, and did not bode well for the United States at least.