The rise of China in the global geopolitical context usually conjures images of a bipolar struggle between it and the United States. However, some pundits point to signs of a more multipolar world order emerging, entities such as the European Union have begun to emerge as significant stakeholders and actors on the global stage, even of a ‘strategic triangle’ between the US, the EU, and China. The relative size of the two economies and the growing volume of trade show that EU-China relations could prove consequential in regards to the balance of global power.

China’s global ambitions and growing tensions with the US are no secret, and as a result, the latter has become increasingly hostile to the prospect of deepening cooperation and ties, which the former naturally seeks an alternative. Similarly, a more ambitious EU has emerged, seeking to decrease their reliance on their traditional ally, the US. The EU’s own leadership and those of its major member-states such as Germany and France have vocally stated that it wishes to be an independent actor capable of consequentially influencing the global order. This has been reinforced by the AUKUS submarine row, which increased European skepticism of the unity of transatlantic policy, and on the surface, dashed the US and the UK’s credibility with France. The rhetoric of ‘strategic autonomy’ by diversifying relations towards China could not only directly enhance the EU’s economic prowess, but also give the EU leverage over US demands, and perhaps secure more concessions from the latter to satisfy EU foreign policy objectives. 

A Mutual Exchange?

Current relations between the European Union and China remain cooperative, as they have recently finalised the Comprehensive Agreement on Investment (CAI) in December 2020, and the acceptance of Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) projects, especially in EU Central and Eastern European Countries (CEEC) such as Greece. These are in the background of a “comprehensive strategic partnership” announced in 2003, heralding a strong willingness to deepen ties. In terms of economic interests, the European Union and China both see opportunities for growth and development in freer trade. With an increasingly protectionist United States regardless of who sits in the presidency, the EU and China are in favour of liberalising trade. In a geopolitical context, the former, especially its industrial juggernaut Germany, sees a massive potential market in the latter for its exports.

However, China stands to gain a lot more from increased access to European markets. In addition to its size, the European market’s relatively higher level of development means that its more developed technologies and intellectual properties could be traded or transferred as an alternative source from the United States, which relationship can be identified as a “technology for markets swap”. A partnership with the EU would provide a stable source of these assets, with acquisitions, joint ventures, and even ‘forced technology transfers’, which would accelerate Beijing’s own programme of modernisation and dominate next-generation industries, such as in pharmaceuticals, spearheaded by the Made in China 2025 programme. This would close the comparative advantage the ‘West’ has had over China in technologies, such as in photovoltaics, and raise the latter’s profile to relative equilibrium to the West. Despite the enormous amount of transfers, the EU and individual member-states have passed or proposed regimes and laws to more closely scrutinise foreign investments on ‘sensitive’ technologies or infrastructure. This reduces the chance for those to be transferred to China and limits the impact of this trade on critical security issues, such as their application to China’s military modernisation.

A House Divided

However, it is also important to consider that Sino-European interactions are relatively more complex than other state interactions, with 3 overlapping levels - member state, sub-regional, and the Union itself, which can lead to unclear and sometimes conflicting narratives and difficulties in diplomacy. This leads to inconsistent policies on all levels, which can distort the narrative of EU-China relations. For example, China’s notable separate engagements with CEECs known as the 16+1 (previously 17+1) due to the BRI projects, despite falling below expectations, have raised eyebrows in Brussels itself. The latter has suspicions that this format may be aimed at influencing the policy-making decisions in the EU and using the power imbalance of the relations to China’s advantage, in addition, the members may be using this to leverage Brussels for more favourable terms themselves. Members’ perspectives on China also differ wildly, for example, the Netherlands recently recognised that a genocide was occurring in Xinjiang, while other countries such as Greece and Hungary abstained from a statement condemning China’s Xinjiang policies with the former even blocking an EU statement on the matter. This is just one example to show that structural weaknesses and complexities exist within the relationship that exacerbates suspicions, which makes a genuine and sustainable partnership difficult between the EU and China. 

However, that is less of a problem for the United States, which although has distanced itself from the transatlantic alliance recently under the turbulent foreign policy of the Trump administration, remains the preferred partner of the EU. The US is a normative ally with deep cultural, historical, and normative ties to the EU, being both committed to liberal democratic norms. Its engagement of European countries has an absolute advantage over China’s, as it is not just viewed as a partner, but a friend, enabling deeper levels of cooperation in scope, not just in scale. This is evidenced by the fact that most EU countries rely on it for defence via NATO, and clearly value its relationship and input, illustrated by most members eventually adopting strict regulations for Huawei and ZTE to operate in their countries due to US pressure. China, on the other hand, faces existing suspicions that its intentions are malign, a relative lack of shared security interests due to the sheer distance, and serious disagreements on human rights.

European Pragmatism

The EU is unlikely to directly and significantly challenge China directly and significantly, as the sheer distance of spheres of interest limits cooperation as well as disagreements in purely geopolitical terms. The ratification of the previously-mentioned CAI was frozen, not because of specific concerns of human rights or violations of international law, due to Chinese sanctions on European officials raising the Xinjiang issue. In addition, the EU’s, and that of its member-states hopes to reform China’s economic and political system with ‘economic diplomacy’ in accordance with EU norms of liberal democracy with a free private market are likely to be disappointed. This is due to the EU’s ‘sticky tolerance’, meaning that it is already semi-tolerant towards China’s actions contrary to the former’s norms and is unlikely to suddenly change stance due to structural and rhetorical paradoxes, and China’s own anathema of foreign commentary and interventions in others’ domestic and regional affairs. This is in the geopolitical context of China’s behaviour especially in the South China Sea, and its general posturing and strategic view of the United States as a systemic rival. That is not to say European states will not have a concrete stance towards China. France, in particular, has shown the most interest in projecting its power overseas in the Indo-Pacific, and is attempting to forge deeper relations with India, one of China’s main rivals in the region.

Nevertheless, the contradiction experienced by the EU between the main economic partner (China) and security partner (US) is a dilemma many states will encounter this century. The latter is simply too great an economic opportunity and powerful actor to shut out completely on bilateral and global issues, despite US pressure. This also signals the widespread proliferation of realpolitik in global relations. As the US and EU fall back on this strategy to protect themselves and ensure their status in the world, the neo-realist paradigm of great-power relations gains credence over the rhetoric of the liberal world order. The selective and reserved actions of the EU in punishing China over its contraventions of international norms and practices such as human rights and territorial violations, signal that they are either, for now, symbolic attempts to persuade China to change course, or a consequence of its nightmarish bureaucracy.

Beyond trade, there is potential for cooperation on issues such as global finance and climate governance. Nevertheless, a comprehensive strategic rebalancing of the EU as an independent geopolitical power, in favour of China is unlikely despite the rhetoric. This reality has already been recognised by China, as policy papers published in China take the view that the EU has failed to deliver “a distinctive pole of authority in the post–Cold War arrangement.”. China is likely to remain a significant partner but without deeper levels of bilateral engagement with the EU in security or normative issues across the world.