Most have already heard and are familiar with the ramifications and examples of hybrid warfare, or grey zone doctrines. The use of information and clandestine political dealings, brought to the limelight by the alleged Russian interference in the 2016 US election, and continuing cyber-attacks on Western systems have already attracted the attention of the mainstream. The ability of the Russian state, particularly of Putin, in maintaining and executing this strategy is highly dependent on what the commentator Mark Galeotti calls ‘Adhocracy’, which involves a degree of state sponsorship or systematic encouragement of nominally private organisations to act in a manner which would traditionally be the responsibility of the government.

Not only is Russia incentivised to develop asymmetric and clandestine strategies to counter the perceived threat of the United States and project its influence in the West due to its relative weakness, but it is also due to the nature of Putin’s highly personalised regime. The outsourcing of state work is nothing new – the concept of the proxy war has been present since wars have begun. However, it is for the purpose and doctrine that emphasises strikes by regular forces outside of the nominal state purview, yet continuously exhibit a suspicious alignment with foreign policy interests that give it plausible deniability.

The Adhocrats

The Wagner group, a nominally private military contractor based in Russia has been involved in many conflicts that involve Russian interests, such as the War in the Donbas and the Syrian Civil War. The Internet Research Agency, employing thousands, used fake accounts and trolls to influence Western social media in the run-up to the 2016 US Presidential Election, both allegedly directed by Yevgeny Prigozhin, also known as ‘Putin’s chef’. Prigozhin does not hold any official position in the Russian security or diplomatic apparatus, yet the US state seems to have taken a great interest in him, placing him as the key individual responsible for these groups. A less brazen enterprise has been taken by multiple individuals such as in allegedly abusing export laws and resales of equipment meant for Russia’s healthcare system to fill a slush fund. This was worth hundreds of millions of dollars, and for the purpose of financing the construction of ‘Putin’s Palace’ at Cape Idokopas, revealed in Russian opposition politician Alexei Navalny’s exposé. In the latter’s case, a businessman named Arkady Rotenberg, reportedly close to Putin, has taken public responsibility, insulating Putin from the potentially damaging revelations that he might have built such an opulent residence with public or dubiously sourced funds. These individuals seem to be overwhelmingly businessmen, reminiscent of the oligarchs, but now their position is derived to a much greater extent from Putin himself — a manifestation of the power vertical beyond the state.

The Boons of Adhocracy

The adhocratic approach can give distance to any potential accusation or allegations of hostile actions or direction by the Kremlin. So far, no concrete link can be established between these semi-private organisations and the Russian state apparatus. They could even be a front for Putin to cite in allegations of state misconduct even if a link was traced back to Russia, as ‘patriotic’ citizens could be independently retaliating against the West for its targeting of Russia. Of course, it should be kept in mind that, despite the long arm of Putin’s regime, anti-Western sentiments are indeed high in Russia, and it would not be implausible that at least some incidents are the actions of independent actors.

This approach can drum up the leader’s personal support and power base as well, beyond the limits and nominal rules of the bureaucracy. Actors such as Prigozhin hold no official position but are raised up by the unofficial personal power and blessing of Putin. This undermines traditional bureaucratic hierarchies and muddles understandings of subordination and authority, making titles and offices less reliable, as true power flows directly from the leader and his favour. In addition, if Navalny’s allegations are true, then this effect further builds into a reverse effect of incentivising individuals towards embarking on their own projects to please Putin in a positive reinforcing loop of centralisation.

A Faustian Bargain

In a country as powerful and influential as Russia, the use of such strategy is worrying. This approach can be beneficial in a clandestine context in distancing the leader from domestic anger if they are exposed, and in generating incentives to please Putin, even necessary in the context of Russia’s relative weakness against its perceived adversary in the form of the West and in centralising domestic power. However, the informal outsourcing of state security and intervention also means a loss of control due to the need for distancing and the lack of formal institutions. An example of this would be the Wagner group’s attempt to seize a Syrian oil refinery near Deir al Zor in 2018 without Moscow’s express permission which was decisively defeated with heavy losses by local US forces. Russian air forces either could not or were not willing to provide them with air support, despite their significant presence in Syria at the time, indicating that Wagner Group was out of line with Moscow’s own policies, thus resulting in an uncoordinated unsanctioned strike.

The employment of adhocratic techniques by Putin to centralise his personal power further undermines Russia’s politics, which is a tangled network of graft, clientelism, with the blending of public and private interests. This has long-term implications for his succession, as the significant power vacuum left by Putin’s eventual departure from the top of Russian politics, by old age or otherwise, will pose a considerable threat to the country’s political and economic stability. As his popularity wanes due to the poor state of the economy, and from the efforts of opposition politicians, Putin will endeavour to further employ adhocratic methods to secure his own position as much as possible. There is much at stake in Russia and internationally in this context. Corruption and mismanagement could surge in the waning days of Putin’s reign. He is unlikely to genuinely retire from politics or bestow a successor with the power he once possessed, to ensure his survival and mitigate the chances of his permanent removal as a potential threat, illustrated by his recent drive to ensure legal immunity from prosecution and a permanent position in the legislature for former presidents.

A power struggle and conditions reminiscent of the fall of the USSR could manifest themselves again. Crime, illicit arms trade, further backsliding from a sense of stability or prosperity face Russians if Putin’s personal power collapses in the sudden confusion of the collapse of the political hierarchy. Globally, Russia’s foreign policy could become even more desperate and unpredictable, flaring up tensions with the West to ensure domestic popularity, or individuals taking it upon themselves to impress Putin and earn themselves more favour.

Any change, however, must come from Russia itself. Western intervention will be denounced by the people, and swiftly crushed by the Kremlin. Ordinary Russians must find their own solution to this ticking time bomb, for their own sake and the world’s.

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