Since the launch of the Sputnik 1 satellite by the Soviet Union, fears of weaponised satellites and the morphing of Space into a theatre of warfare has chilled policymakers, scientists and the general public alike. Such fears have become all the more relevant in an age of globalisation in which there is a heavy reliance on satellite communication networks, GPS constellations, and space-bound meteorological services - all of which have prompted some world leaders to rethink the scope of their presence in space.  

The current strategic value of satellite communications (satcoms) both for civilian industry and military purposes are borderline incalculable. Power grids, emergency services communication and operation, global finance, maritime and air navigation, automated farming – are all reliant on satcom services. As technology strives towards automation, the growing reliance on satcoms will make their safety all the more critical to national security, making them prime targets for foreign actors looking to disrupt rival systems of communication and coordination.

"Biblically catastrophic” scenarios of GPS and general satcoms outages present policymakers with a grim picture of reality in which few remedies exist to choose from. Such scenarios have spurred the development of Space Forces in the world’s major powers, many of which pull together existing military assets, programmes and funding under one branch to better coordinate the protection and projection of their potential interests and assets.  

Since 1999, Russia, India, China, and the United States have proven their ground-to-space and air-to-space warfare capabilities, having shot down satellites of their own using Anti-Satellite (ASAT) weapons. World powers such as Russia and China have since established “Space Forces” either under the auspices of another military branch – or in the case of the US created an entirely new branch to service its space-bound operational capacity. Such a security environment is creating the conditions for a potential arms race.  

The Russian Space Forces, part of the Russian Aerospace Forces, have developed a significant ASAT capability in recent years. Just last year the US Space Command expressed concern regarding the deployment and testing of a Russian “co-orbital ASAT”, as well as two other ASAT missile launches in 2020. Likely related to the development and testing of the upcoming A-235 and S-500 ASAT/Anti-Ballistic Missile systems – scheduled to replace or complement the A-135 and S-400 systems respectively. The Russian ASAT capability however is not limited to ground-to-space missile systems. Burevestnik ASAT missiles deployed from modified MiG-31(BM) interceptors might become a mainstay in the Russian Space Force’s arsenal given the service lifespan extension of the MiG-31 platform beyond 2030 - pending the deployment of the PAK-DP - and are expected to see operational deployment around 2022. Russian ASAT weapon development has also included “non-destructive” weapons that blind satellites rather than destroy them, with the Sokol Eshelon laser-based ASAT deployed on Beriev A-60 aircraft expected to have finished development in 2018.  

The Chinese Space Systems Department – part of the PLA Strategic Support Force – has been identified by the US security community as having developed a credible ASAT weapon threat. Surface-based ASAT missiles such as the SC-19 (based on the DF-21 ABM) and the Dong-Neng-3 pose a similar threat to the Russian A-235 and S-500's, and ground-based laser weapons have thought to have been tested, but with inconclusive results. Chinese funds being allocated towards the development of forthcoming ASAT technologies are ultimately expected to rapidly shrink the gap between the Asian Giant and the former Cold-War rivals. 

The US Space Force currently does not operate any known specific ASAT programme and not much is known about US ASAT weapon development. In 2008, the US Navy deployed a RIM-161 (SM-3) surface-to-air missile from an Aegis Cruiser to intercept and destroy a US satellite. Whilst of course demonstrating the ASAT capabilities of the RIM-161 specifically, it also hints at the potential ad-hoc usage of other surface-to-air missiles such as those implemented under the THAAD platform. Given the establishment of the US Space Force in 2019, significant investment into ASAT weaponry for the purposes of extending the US military dominance into the theatre of the space domain is expected to occur.  

The potential for a “Star Wars” influenced arms race is credible given the pace of development of ASAT weapons in China and Russia and their growing interest in attaining ultimate space dominance. Observed in the development of Russia´s GLONASS and China´s BeiDou satellite networks, the reliance on the US GPS satellite network is diminishing and opens a window of opportunity for the two rival states to target the American system with no consequences for its own operational capabilities. The establishment of the US Space Force signals the commitment of the US to defend its interests in space, and its will to extend its power projection into new domains beyond those envisioned by the Reagan administration during the end years of Cold War. 

Ultimately, until there is an established deterrence strategy – or more comprehensive international non-proliferation treaty – vis-a-vis threats beyond the domains of terrestrial warfare strategic vulnerabilities will require both increased interest in developing defensive technologies and alternative means for global communications and coordination.   

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