Where does NATO fit into the 21st century?

During the Cold War, the threat to Western democracy and US hegemony was centred in the Soviet Union, and in this sense NATO’s mission was clear. Yet much has changed since the Soviet collapse, the Russian threat is a shadow of its former self. At present Russia’s economy is around the size of Brazil, its defence spending is roughly similar to that of the UK, and its global reach is diminished. The Russia that rose from the ashes is not the Soviet Union – that much is obvious. By sheer collective defence spending and economic weight, it might be reasonable to assume that NATO without the US, would be well-positioned to handle the Russian threat. This is perhaps more idyllic than reality.

To Deal with the Bear

NATO members specifically lack the conviction to deal with security threats on their doorstep. Much of this comes from the identity crisis NATO has suffered in the decades since the end of the Cold War, and the ever more present “mission creep” of the organisation. With Russia’s transition to “Grey Zone tactics” reaching maturity– such as election interference and cyber-espionage – the traditional style, Mutual Defence arrangements of the organisation have become all the less relevant. Filling this void of purpose, NATO has gone on to conduct more “out of area operations”, such as peacekeeping missions, counterterrorism and nation-building exercises in Africa and the Middle East.

Most importantly, regardless of any institutional or diplomatic commitments or arrangements, Europe lacks the will – and the budget – to fight. US defence spending represents ~70% of total spending on defence by NATO members, and only 9 members of NATO (not including the US) commit to the 2% of GDP defence spending target. Neither of the continent’s two largest economies – France and Germany – meet the 2% of GDP defence spending target. In Germany, public opinion remains a barrier to remedying this problem. Successive polls in Germany have illustrated warming in public attitudes to the idea of increasing military spending, up from 32% in 2017 to 40% in 2019, yet the absence of a majority ought to be noted. Additionally, a recent Pew Research poll elucidated this issue further, revealing that 60% of Germans believe that if Russia engaged in a serious military confrontation with a NATO ally, that Germany categorically should not come to its ally’s aid. Most alarmingly, this sentiment isn’t exclusive to Germany.

Only 41% of Spaniards and French believe their countries should intervene to defend a NATO member against Russia. In Italy, the sentiment is as low as 25% in favour of defending their NATO allies. The same study revealed that most NATO member states expected the US to intervene on their behalf. With public support so low for commitment to NATO’s original raison d’etre, questions ought to be raised about the feasibility of some of the alliance’s aims in the absence of US support.

“Since the 1990s, NATO has been engaged in never-ending transformations.”

Dr Sarah Moller, Professor of International Security, University of New Jersey

It is perhaps expected that the EU will fill the void of the US in terms of leadership regarding European security. As the development of a European Army and a European Security Council gains traction amongst EU member states, it is likely that such entities will assume many – if not most – of the responsibilities of NATO, in turn making it obsolete. Whether such arrangements would prove to overcome the dysfunctional tendencies of much of the EU’s current security arrangements remains to be seen. The absence of any consensus around the management of Russia is evidence of this. Germany is facilitating the Nordstream 2 pipeline and France is seeking rapprochement with Moscow, all whilst Russia flexes its muscles with Belarus during the Zapad 2021 wargames this week – the largest display of military force since the end of the Cold War.

Strategic Differences

From the American perspective, as Professor John Mearsheimer puts it, the United States has three key regions of strategic interest – Europe, the Asia-Pacific, and the Persian Gulf. The profligate deployment of American military resources in Europe to subsidise the hole in European security financing will eventually wind down as the US addresses China’s ascension with greater conviction. Europe and the Persian Gulf will not merit the same degree of resource commitment as East Asia over the course of the next few decades – notwithstanding any extreme changes to the security environments in these regions. As the Pivot to Asia accelerates, Washington will be looking to shore up its East Asian alliances with South Korea and Japan, as well as foster and bolster new relationships with agreeable states in the South East.

“There is no way that NATO will move into the South China Sea …”

Jens Stoltenberg, NATO Secretary General

The next task on the US foreign policy chopping block is the management of Chinese influence in the Indo-Pacific. Such a task is almost certainly going to focus around the Taiwan Strait, and in this regard, there is very little the US can expect from NATO in terms of assistance.

China does pose some degree of threat to NATO and should concern its member states. Cyberwarfare, anti-satellite weaponry, and a presence in the Arctic alongside Russia all require NATO’s attention. Despite China featuring in the 2021 NATO Summit in Brussels, there is, however, no indication of NATO interest in involvement in the Asia-Pacific aside from strengthening relations with Australia, Japan, South Korea and New Zealand.

In a decade where US involvement and interest in Europe is subsiding, where the strategic dynamics of global economic and security challenges will center around East Asia, the limitations of the reach and scope of activity of NATO will expose shortcomings that may lead the organization to defer responsibilities to new EU agencies. Until then, NATO will continue soul-searching and responding within its capacity - if it has the will - to European security threats.

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