This author had previously pessimistically predicted a defeat of the Kabul government against the Taliban after - at least - a protracted war. This proved to be an overly optimistic assessment of the government’s competence.

The swift collapse of the Kabul regime, which turned out much weaker than any analyst thought, has rattled most with a stake in the country. The war, if one could call it that, was relatively bloodless and lasted only weeks, not months or years. Afghanistan’s neighbours, who understandably fear a massive influx of Afghan refugees and a safe haven for extremists on their doorstep have taken measures to prepare themselves. Russia, China, and neighbouring Central Asian countries have conducted military exercises and anti-terrorism drills as the Taliban consolidated their de facto rule of Afghanistan. Many of these countries have linked attacks in their own country to the global jihadist phenomenon, and the wider War on Terror. The United States has since regarded Chechen and Uyghur movements as such terrorist organisations in the context of Russian and Chinese efforts respectively. Despite Western (and Afghan) pundits warning of the loss in US power and prestige by withdrawing from Afghanistan to Russia and China, there is ample evidence to suggest that they begrudgingly supported the US military presence in its counter-terrorism efforts, from official rhetoric to logistical support. It is reasonable to say that the latter accepted the Taliban as the rulers of Afghanistan in the same reluctant breath.

Russia and China, pragmatic though they may be in their foreign policy, would seem they would shun this resurgent regime, given their sour perception of radical Islam. Instead, they were among the first to call for supporting the Taliban government, and speculation for new deeper levels of cooperation involving investment and security cooperation between them is starting to materialise in the popular media. 

Dual Containment

Contrary to popular representations of recent opportunism, Russia and China have long-held ties with the Taliban, even before the announcement of the departure of US troops and the fall of the first Afghan cities. This understandably upset the former Kabul government, but the fact that the Taliban could credibly topple, or at least challenge the internationally-recognised government to a significant extent was recognised in Beijing and Moscow, was acted upon. However different, they recognised that the Taliban were an important partner if they wanted the scourge of international jihadism gone. Despite pragmatic reasons, internal security and confidence reassured Beijing and Moscow that they could manage with a Taliban government on their doorsteps.

Much has changed in the last two decades in the lesser-known Russian and Chinese ‘Wars on Terror’. Chechen extremism was curbed by the iron fist of the Kadyrovs, and China’s increasing crackdown on the Uyghurs has garnered increasing condemnation, albeit mostly from the West. Regional institutions such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation have strengthened counter-terrorism efforts and awareness throughout Central Asia, and the threat of international and domestic terrorism has largely subsided. Although at a considerable social cost, these measures have strengthened Beijing and Moscow’s perceived ability to manage such activities. Incidents such as the traumatic Beslan siege and the Urumqi riots seem like distant memories of bygone nightmares. Whatever their motivations are, the perceived successful handling of this established a precedent that they could manage potential ‘overspills’, and even an opportunity for them to have a stable Afghanistan. Optimistically, the Taliban could very well be a second Iran, which was initially radical in similar ways but became moderate, and now shares warm relations with Russia and China. The inclusion and support of a moderate Taliban’s rule over a stable Afghanistan could very well prove the final nail in the coffin of international jihadism in the region (if not for Pakistan, but that’s another story).

To Each Their Own

In conversing with the Taliban leadership, they have come to the conclusion that they have indeed changed in their international approach. Although the Taliban’s view on domestic social policies such as women’s rights has not deviated much since their downfall two decades ago despite their conciliatory rhetoric, they did not want to be pariahs. In this, they did not have to moderate their policies but simply contain them within Afghanistan’s borders.

The Taliban’s domestic policies and fundamentalist interpretation of Sharia Law have long rattled foreign observers. This hardly explains the eagerness of China and Russia’s eagerness to establish relations. Indeed, the impetus for this is for security, as mentioned earlier, but also for accepting a country that adheres to Beijing and Moscow’s perceptions of an ideal global order. In this, each country respects the others’ laws and practices non-intervention domestic affairs. International cooperation is on the basis of economic and security, and most notably the absence of human rights. The Taliban have hinted that they will support China’s policies in Xinjiang internationally, and China will probably invest in infrastructure and businesses in Afghanistan, an exchange repeated throughout the wider Muslim world. 

The West does not hold the Taliban hostage. Enormous amounts of aid and Afghan monetary reserves are, but those will not compel the Taliban to change domestic policy. They will not betray their core identity for these sums. Besides, there are new indiscriminate alternatives for development next door.

Water Under the Bridge

Many in the popular media have speculated that the withdrawal of the United States and the resulting collapse of the US-backed Afghan government would be an enormous blow to its credibility as an ally, and the tangible manifestation of its global decline.  This is a simplistic argument that has little basis in its new focus of great power competition, and represents instead, a redirection of resources towards new objectives. Its European and Asian alliances remain steadfast, knowing that instead, they benefit from this, as America’s attention shifts towards Russia and China. Indeed, the often-compared fall of Saigon sparked similar concerns but proved unwarranted, as some scholars have pointed out.

The notable exception is Pakistan, whose value as an ally was always questionable due to its alleged links with the Taliban and other radical groups. Now that the US has left Afghanistan, it could tilt fully towards China, while the US embraces India in opposing the latter, untangling an uncomfortable marriage that was a legacy of the Cold War.

However, the issue remains of how the United States chooses to live with its choices and the new reality in Afghanistan. On this, the US is unlikely to recognise the Taliban government, not until at least the next presidency. The blow of the collapse is too fresh in the minds of the American public, and if Biden has any aspirations of re-election, another blow of recognising the Taliban government would surely doom his chances. Nevertheless, American pragmatism can also be surprising, as with Russia and China. Americans eventually, albeit reluctantly, de facto recognised the current governments in Tehran and Hanoi, who America once made its staunchest enemies and anathema to its identity. It is only a matter of time before the wound heals, for there are bigger fish to fry.

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