For 15 years Germany – and arguably the European Union – has been steered by the leadership of Angela Merkel. Her chancellorship has seen Germany (and the EU) face significant challenges across a range of dimensions such as; immigration in the form of the European Migrant Crisis, the global macroeconomy during the Subprime Mortgage Crisis, security with the Russian annexation of Crimea, and the Covid-19 Pandemic. Whilst the jury is still out on how well these crises have been managed, her political manoeuvring has seen her party – the CDU – become the largest in the Bundestag, perhaps representing the popularity of her leadership and policy outlook. However, with the German Federal Election only months away, her successor’s answer to these issues will influence German and EU foreign policymaking for the next four years or more.

The centre-right Christian Democratic Union (CDU) and left-wing Social Democratic Party (SDP) – Germany’s two major parties – are best positioned to win majorities and elect their candidates as Chancellor, placing their candidates – Armin Laschet and Olaf Scholz respectively – as the two likely successors to Merkel. Either one of these men will enter office (hopefully) on the tail end of a global pandemic and possible double-dip recession, however, perhaps overlooked in the current political climate is their difference in foreign policy agenda. Germany and the West at large remain at threat from Russian electoral interference and pipeline diplomacy, terror threats and instability in North Africa and the Middle East, rising internal nationalist sentiment, and an increasingly assertive China.

More of the Same?

The CDU candidate Armin Laschet is expected to continue much of Merkel’s foreign policy objectives and policies. In regard to Russia, Merkel’s colleague in the CDU, has called for rapprochement vis-à-vis Russia – a continuation of Merkel’s Russia strategy – stating in an interview with Deutsche Welle (DW) that "When things get difficult, you have to talk more, not less". He is expected to continue to support the Nordstream 2 pipeline alongside the potential sanction pressure collaboration with the US on Russia were Moscow to cut off Ukraine and Poland from the Nordstream 1 pipeline. Whilst Germany and the US have struck a deal regarding the pipeline, this may increase strain on Germany’s relationship with the United States if Germany doesn’t play ball regarding the sanctions, not to mention the resulting expansion of Russian influence over Europe’s energy supply. Particularly worrying is the impact on Ukraine given that the Nordstream 2 pipeline is likely to see Ukraine become increasingly economically isolated in regard to the transit fees it enjoyed from Nordstream 1. Given the unresolved conflict in the Donbas region and Russian support for the separatists, the new bargaining chips held by Moscow in the form of the energy security of Nordstream 2 may impact the EU’s action.

Unsurprisingly, Laschet has also publicly backed French proposals for an EU Army and an EU Intelligence Agency alongside further and deeper integration and reform. Laschet has also called for increased military spending to achieve Germany’s commitment to the 2% of GDP NATO spending target, as well as an enhanced presence in Mali regarding the UN peacekeeping operation. It is clear from Lashcet’s support for these types of commitments that his chancellorship would see Germany at least maintain its current posture vis-à-vis its foreign policy agenda.

 But what about a potential change in chancellorship?

Something New?

The SPD’s foreign policy platform does not radically differ from the CDU. They too are proponents of deeper integration of the EU, and follow the CDU on most dimensions of the present foreign policy agenda. The complexity of a Scholz chancellorship comes however from the most likely pathway to victory – a coalition. This brings into relevance the foreign policy platforms of the minor German parties, some of which are radically different to those asserted by the CDU and SPD.

The most likely coalition would be shared with Die Linke (The Left). Such an arrangement would see major tensions arise on matters of foreign policy, specifically on Germany’s relationship with the US, Russia, and its military commitments abroad and its membership in NATO. Part of The Left’s foreign policy platform is the adamant opposition to NATO membership and a preference for its dissolution entirely, and favourable rapprochement with Russia. With absolute opposition to military intervention of any kind beyond German borders, it is clear to see the dysfunction that may arise from a coalition of such stark differences. A paralysed chancellor Scholz could become almost entirely ineffective abroad and may see German influence on EU foreign policy wane as France could take the reins on issues such as Russia, Ukraine, accession talks, and the Migrant Crisis.

To compound the uncertainty, the polls between incumbent centrist Macron and populist-nationalist Le Pen neck and neck in the shadow of the 2022 French Presidential Elections, the latter being a well-known Euroskeptic. The possibility of a Le Pen presidency could shift European policy away from the conventional ‘Western’ order in favour of warmer Russian relations, or even deal a severe blow to the EU by leaving. Europe has long been hobbled by the lack of will and disunity on a myriad of issues, including identity, sovereignty, and most notably, security. Such a sequence of events would further exacerbate its dilemmas, destabilise the bloc, and strain transatlantic relations to an extent not seen for years.

With the German federal elections only a few months away the future of German and EU foreign policy hinges on the continuation of years past, or a new more uncertain paradigm.

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