The research, development, and deployment of Hypersonic Missiles have captured the attention of defence policymakers all over the world. Their absolute lethality towards aircraft carriers, in particular, has prompted the United States Navy to reassess the operational capabilities of their carrier groups in the event of another Taiwan Strait crisis. Their capability to reach (almost) any target globally in approximately one hour greatly exacerbates the issues of Warhead and Target Ambiguity. Just last month, the Chinese military appeared to test a nuclear-capable hypersonic glide vehicle – a space-bound missile that circled the globe before gliding at hypersonic speeds to its target (albeit missing it by two-dozen miles).

In particular, the demonstration of hypersonic missile capabilities in this manner is alarming for US defence policymakers, given that the missiles are capable of evading advanced radar warning systems and are increasing difficult to intercept due to their manoeuvrability. Whilst perhaps a new addition to the Chinese missile arsenal, the Russian military tested a hypersonic missile earlier this year and has been known to have one of the most advanced hypersonic capabilities in the world since the deployment of the Avangard (a hypersonic weapon capable of reaching speeds of Mach 27).

So what would the deployment of a hypersonic weapon look like?

No Time To Die

In a hypothetical scenario where the US launches a pre-emptive strike on Iranian nuclear facilities – presumably after a crisis escalation – the missile would pass over the Arctic and through Russian airspace on its way to the target site in Iran. Russian early warning systems would only detect the missile’s presence 3 minutes before it enters Russian airspace – therefore giving policymakers nearly no time at all to determine the missile’s intended target or payload (be it conventional or nuclear) and whether or not to launch a counterattack. The possible outcomes are bleak.

Perhaps closer to reality would be an escalation between China and the US.

Recently, President Biden appeared to contradict the US policy of Strategic Ambiguity regarding the defence of Taiwan in the event of a Chinese invasion, responding to a question that the US would indeed come to the defence of Taiwan. Although White House Press Secretary Jen Psaki reaffirmed that the quote from the President was merely a gaffe and not in line with the US official posture towards the Taiwan Strait, the implications of this new display of Chinese military technology are salient for US policymakers if they were to advise intervention in Taiwan.

In the case the US does come to the defence of Taiwan, it is likely that hypersonic missiles will play a significant role for both sides. As previously mentioned, hypersonic missiles play a key role in disabling American aircraft carriers, and by extension, the mitigation of the US Airforce over the Taiwan Strait and the island. Likewise, however, US missiles could be used to pre-emptively destroy Chinese hypersonic missile capabilities by targeting Chinese launch sites in advance of the deployment of American fleets. Such moves, however, could lead the conflict into dangerous levels of escalation as “warhead ambiguity” (whether the weapon is conventional or nuclear) begins to take a greater role in decision-making, and as the time for said decision-making becomes shorter.  

Some analysts however argue that current ICBM deterrence capabilities are sufficient given that conventional ICBM’s re-entry speeds are hypersonic. As mentioned in a previous article, the development of Russian S-500 missiles has been suggested by some experts to pose a credible deterrence to hypersonic weapons. A likely eventual defence capability, however, lies in land-based high-powered lasers that could destroy the warhead mid-flight.

An Arms Race Worth Stopping?

Regardless of the development of defences against hypersonic weapons, the principle of their development to beat current ICBM defences through sheer speed requires some degree of international attention and regulation. At present, only the US, Russia, and China have developed a credible form of hypersonic capability. Some commentators, such as OxPol, have suggested an informal international hypersonic weapons test moratorium but have conceded that given some states such as Russia, the US, and China have already tested missiles, that other states would view such a proposition as unfair.

There does seem to be some give, however, at least on the side of Moscow.

Just last year, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov proposed that Russia was willing to put its hypersonic missile development on the table as part of a broader deal on arms control with the US. Whether or not the Biden administration will take the opportunity to nip this arms race in the bud is to be seen.